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THE INTERNATIONAL LAW OF COMMODITY
AGREEMENTS
HERMAN WALKER*
Since intergovernmental commodity agreements are agreements between govern-
ments about internationally traded commodities and are designed to affect the flow
of commodities in international commerce, they may be regarded as a form of trade
agreement.1 Therefore, it is from the standpoint of relationship with the legal
standards applicable to trade agreements generally that the subject will be examined
here.
THE GENERAL FRAmEwonK
In the large sense, any trade agreement is a commodity agreement, because trade
agreements deal with the tangible things that move in commerce and commit
governments as concerns the governmental measures (e.g., rates of duty, quotas)
impinging on importation and exportation generally. As a generic term to denote
the subject-matter of trade agreements, "commodities" is used interchangeably with
(Carticles," "goods," and "products." The former, however, has also come to be
used often to refer to a segment of the whole, with or without adjectivals such as
"basic" commodity or "primary" commodity or "bulk" commodity, to mean fungible
goods of a raw material or semi-processed sort. Hence "commodity agreement" as
a special class. Even so, "commodities" limitatively defined can be, and normally
are, part and parcel of trade agreements concerned with the generality of trade. As
such, they can be, and are, included on an equal footing with other goods in schedules
of agreed tariff rates and, unless expressly set apart, subjected alike to the common
rules regarding most-favored-nation treatment, internal taxation, quantitative re-
strictions, rates-of-exchange, methods of valuation, and the rest.
There now exists a widely-accepted master agreement dealing with trade: the
General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (the GATT, or the "General Agreement")
which, in the course of thirty-six articles, nine annexes, and several other ancillary
instruments, sets forth a comprehensive body of international rules governing trade
policies and practices.2 In general, this body of rules covers all the foreign commerce
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'They can also be regarded as a "species of cartel" (as in GEoRGE W. STocXING & MYRON W. WAT-
ruNS, CARTELs OR COMPEOroN 302 and passim (948)), inasmuch as they "restrain competition" and
"limit access to markets" (wording of introductory provision on restrictive business practices, HAvANA
CHmRTER art. 46). They are on their face distinguishable from cartels, however, by the circumstance that
they are entered into by governments rather than by private (or "public commercial") enterprises, and as a
matter of public international relations rather than of "business practices."
' This agreement is in force, for the United States, by virtue of the Protocol of Provisional Application
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of the fifty contracting parties thereto (accounting together for about five-sixths
of "free-world" commerce), without distinction between kinds of goods.3 Under
the aegis of these rules, tens of thousands of tariff positions, in the variegated cus-
toms structures of the members, have been subjected to particular rate-of-duty com-
mitments in the course of the five general rounds of tariff-reduction negotiations
held in GATT conferences from 1947 to date, including commodities for which "inter-
governmental commodity agreements" have been proposed or reached.
The master rules embodied in the General Agreement are framed in light of a
design to stimulate international trade and to promote the efficient international
distribution of production by diminishing and removing the interferences that
prevent the play of market forces from determining the volume and direction of
exports and imports. In the ideal, these rules aim for a competitive world market.
They thus seek to abolish discrimination among sources of supply, whether in the
form of preferential duties, dosed "bilateral" deals, quotas, or otherwise; to dismantle
administrative controls and other managerial devices calculated to substitute trade-
distorting governmental decision for trader discretion; and to establish the fixed
customs duty as the sole regulator-at-law of the movement of goods across national
boundaries, duty-rates in turn to be subject to periodic negotiation with a view to
their progressive lowering. The drafting of these rules, in all their ramifications and
compromises, leaves the ideal short of realization in a number of respects; but the
qualifications and exceptions are for the most part framed in guarded language
designed to curb abuse and to minimize infraction of the scheme's symmetry.
The relatively competitive model of a world market envisioned by this body
of rules is deemed by many interested parties to provide an insufficiently orderly,
just, and efficacious framework for the trade in, and the underlying production of,
certain commodities. Such commodities are those be-dogged by special problems
discussed elsewhere in this issue, the tolerable solution of which is thought to require
some degree of planning and concerted direction on a multi-national basis. It is
for the establishment of a degree of managed trade-economy for such commodities
that "intergovernmental commodity agreements" are designed. The "intergovern-
done at Geneva, Oct. 30, 1947, T.I.A.S. No. 17oo. A convenient print of the text, as currently revised,
is THE GENERAL AGREEMENT ON TAmFFS AND TADE, U.S. DE'r oF STATE Pus. No. 7182 (r961).
'Except for certain ones expressly excluded from the scope of the agreement, notably the monetary
metals (gold and silver), munitions, fissionable materials, archaeological treasures, prison-made goods.
GATT art. XX(c), (e), (f), and art. XXI(b), (i) and (ii); and a special arrangement for Cinematograph
Films, art. IV.
' See, for illustrations, the schedule of tariff concessions accorded by the European Economic Com-
munity (EEC) at the 196o-6i tariff conference, Geneva, consolidated GAIT schedule XL: Cacao (position
s8.os), cotton textiles (positions 55.06, 55.07, 55.09, 6x.oi-6-o5). Pre-EEC commitments on wheat
(Brussels nomenclature position o.o) were variously in force for all the member countries by virtue of
negotiations held in the period 1947-1951. The United States, for example, has made commitments on
the sugar duty (para. 5ox, U.S. tariff) and olive oil (para. 53)-
This statement applies to the particular form of commodity agreement known as a commodity
,.control" agreement (HAvANA CHUTER ch. VI, art. 61, and sec. C (948). There are, in addition, instru-
ments called commodity agreements that are of a less ambitious scope, not involving controls; but these, as
they do not affect the GATT's master rules for trade in general, are not dealt with in the present paper.
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mental commodity agreement," as a term of art, accordingly denotes a multi-
lateral agreement that segregates a given commodity for special handling under
special rules and arrangements going beyond and departing from those governing
the generality of goods. There is no prototype of commodity agreement that serves
as a model; each of the four or five so far successfully negotiated6 during the GATT
era (wheat, tin, sugar, and coffee, with the possible fifth being that on cotton textiles),
differs from the other, each having been tailor-made to fit varying individual cir-
cumstances. But certain key elements, one or more of which are found in some
form in every "commodity control" agreement, give them their distinctiveness and
raise potential questions of compatibility with the master rules set forth in the GATT.
These elements are: (i) the buffer stock device (e.g., tin agreement). This
may be noted and passed over briefly. In and of itself, without more, a buffer-stock
operation, involving in practice merely an open-market intervention taking the
form of a timely buying up and selling of stocks in order to hold price fluctuations
within a minimum-maximum range,7 would not on its face involve any readily
evident conflict with any operative provision of the General Agreement.! Prima
facie incompatibilities emerge, rather, when the agreement provides for:
(2) quantitative limits on imports and/or exports,
(3) quantitative allocations as among suppliers and takers,
accompanied by restraints upon the freedom of importers to procure, or exporters
to sell, outside these quantitative prescriptions. Such features are conspicuously
inconsistent with articles XI and XIII of GATT, and perhaps with article I. There
would also occur an inconsistency with article I and possibly article II as well, if (as
' Non-control, essentially promotional, agreements are not counted here: e.g., "constitution" of the
International Rice Commission, as amended, ig6o, T.I.A.S. No. 5204, and the olive-oil agreement (text in
UNITED NATIONS CONFERENCE ON OLIVE OIL 1955, U.N. Doc. No. E/coNF. 19/5 (N.Y. 1956)) which
especially is concerned with standards, labeling, and indication-of-origin practices. Also excluded are
agreements of the sort mentioned in the exceptions article of the Charter (art. 7o): e.g., those for sanitary
purposes (such as the draft opium convention of 1950, which, however, followed Charter criteria), con-
servation (such as whaling and sealing conventions), or equitable distribution of goods in short supply
(essentially a transient war and war-aftermath phenomenon). Finally, there is omitted, as of no current
pertinence, the International Tea Agreement of 1950, which expired in March 1955; this, it may be
said, was a producer agreement among India, Pakistan, Ceylon, and Indonesia, which, although a "control"
agreement in nature, failed to provide equal representation for consuming countries (text in IaviEw ov
INTERNATIONAL COMMODITY PROBLEMS 1950, at 54-57 (U.N. Do. No. E/1 9 07) (1951). For a com-
pilation of pre-war and early wartime agreements, see INTERNATIONAL LABOR ORGANIZATION, INTER-
GOVERNMENTAL COMMODITY CONTROL AGREEMENTS (1943).
' Such an intervention, as it presumably involves a "regulation of prices" within the intendment of
para. 2(b), art. 6r of the Havana Charter, places an agreement relying on this device within the definition
of a "control" agreement. CLAIR WILCOX, A CHARER FOR WORLD TRADE 119 (949).
' Conceivably, relevant GATT provisions would be art. XVI, on the argument that the buffer-stock is
a form of indirect export subsidy, and art. XVII, on the argument that it is a form of state trading.
But for a complaint to be sustainable under art. XVI, it would have to be shown that the subsidy serves to
"increase exports" from the contracting parties operating the buffer stock at the cost of "serious prejudice
to the interests" of a third party, a showing dificult to make in the premises. As for art. XVII, it would
have to be shown that the operation practiced discrimination among exporting countries in its purchases,
or among importing countries in its sales, a policy course that would violate the inherent aim and nature
of a buffer stock.
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an enforcement measure) penalty duties were assessed upon importations from or
exportations to non-cooperators.
II
THE GENERAL AGmRMmNT ON TARIFFs AND TRADE
The pertinent GATT provisions, that pose questions of compatibility, provide
as follows:
Article XI. General Elimination of Quantitative Restrictions.
I. No prohibitions or restrictions ... whether made effective through quotas, import
or export licenses or other measures, shall be instituted or maintained by any contracting
party on the importation of any product of the territory of any other contracting party
or on the exportation or sale for export of any product destined for the territory of any
other contracting party.
Article XIII. Non-discriminatory Administration of Quantitative Restrictions.
I. No prohibition or restriction shall be applied by any contracting party on the im-
portation of any product of the territory of any other contracting party or on the exportation
of any product destined for the territory of any other contracting party, unless the importa-
tion of the like product of all third countries or the exportation of the like product to all
third countries is similarly prohibited or restrictedY
Article I. General Most-Favored-Nation Treatment.
I. With respect to customs duties and charges of any kind imposed on or in con-
nection with importation or exportation.., any advantage, favour, privilege or immunity
granted by any contracting party to any product originating in or destined for any other
country shall be accorded immediately and unconditionally to the like product originating
in or destined for all other contracting parties.")
In as much as the obligations imposed by these provisions are consensual, the
contracting parties to GATT are free, if they wish, to waive them by agreement.
They can do so formally in "exceptional circumstances" by a two-thirds vote
(article twenty-five, paragraph five), acting "jointly" as CONTRACTING PAR-
TIES,1' a procedure that tends to be utilized only grudgingly. 2 Even without such
Succeeding paragraphs prescribe acceptable methods for realizing the precept of "similarly restricted":
e.g., individual quotas "approaching as closely as possible the shares which the various contracting parties
might be expected to obtain in the absence of such restrictions" (para. 2). The logic of an article XIII,
which presupposes the existence of the very restrictions solemnly outlawed by article XI, is that certain
exceptions to the sweeping rule of art. XI arc recognized: notably, inter alia, restrictions necessary to safe-
guard a country's balance-of-payments (art. XII) or necessary to the orderly administration of a domestic
crop-control program (art. XI, para. 2(c)).
"o The fourth GATT article alluded to, article II, provides for fixed tariff commitments, reached by
negotiation and incorporated into the Schedules annexed to the General Agreement: "bindings" of rates
at fixed levels that a contracting party is obligated not to exceed.
a" This term in all capital letters is used to signify the collectivity of the contracting parties, acting as
a group for decisional purposes and management of the GATr's affairs. This euphemism has been
necessitated by the fact that GATT was created without the formal status of an "organization," but in
the form merely of an international agreement functioning through periodic conferences. Originally, this
improvisation was a stop-gap to tide over until the ITO Charter should come into force. The Charter
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formal action, any special arrangement would in effect be removed implicitly from
the operation of the master rules as between the parties participating in it and, further,
to the extent that non-participants assented. Such assent could, as a practical
matter, be given by failure to object; the GATT is not equipped with a policing
organ, but rather does nurture an emphasis on problem-solving by the process of
cooperation and accommodation. Issue would be drawn, however, if there were
objecting non-participants who considered themselves aggrieved by the impact of a
commodity agreement and chose to interpose complaint. To cover this eventuality,
the General Agreement, in response to a widespread feeling that commodity agree-
ments when desired and needed should be facilitated and that their negotiators should
be allowed a considerable latitude to search out viable terms, contains a special
proviso regarding the permissibility of such agreements.
This proviso, article XX(h), is in the form of a reservation. It provides that
nothing in the General Agreement shall prevent any contracting party from carrying
out the obligations of "any intergovernmental commodity agreement" that meets
certain criteria, subject to the condition that the measures of implementation "are not
applied in a manner which would constitute a means of arbitrary or unjustifiable
discrimination between countries where the same conditions prevail, or a disguised
restriction on international trade." If the commodity agreement, as carried out, falls
within the four corners of this reservation, it is by definition immune from challenge
as to legality. This, however, does not necessarily mean that the GATT leaves
aggrieved members13 without all recourse. For while dissenters would be barred
from alleging an illegal breach of articles I, II, XI, XIII, or XVI or XVII, it would
be open to them to marshal a complaint under article XXII and article XXIII, the
independent force and effectiveness of which, notwithstanding the article XX reserva-
tion, is emphasized by their being carried in sequence at a point after that article.' 4
The burden of proof devolving upon complainant might be substantial. But the
right of discharging this burden, by any contracting party disposed to try, is acknowl-
edged. The fact that the GATT sympathetically recognizes the legitimacy of
commodity agreements does not mean that the presumption in favor of the accept-
having proved abortive, an effort subsequently was made to set up formally an organization to administer
GAT' through the creation of an Organization for Trade Cooperation by special agreement opened for
acceptance on March io, 1955; for text, see GAIT, BASIC INSTRUMENTS AND SELECTaD DocumsENTs, volume
i, revised; for discussion, see Bronz, An International Trade Organization: The Second Attempt, 69 H~tv.
L. REV. 440 (1956). But this effort also failed, owing largely to opposition in the United States Con.
gress. For the United States, the GATT is in effect as an Executive Agreement, by virtue of the Presi-
dent's authority to enter into trade agreements under the provisions of the Trade Agreements Act as
successively extended or replaced since its inception in 1934.
" A cumulative listing of waivers granted, 1947-1961, may be found in GATT, BASIC INsTRUMENTS
ASN Sa=scraD DOCUrNrS 284-87 (ioth Supp. 1962) [hereinafter cited as BISD].
" The term "members" here is used for convenience to denote individual "contracting parties" to the
GATT, the latter term only being the technically correct one in as much as the role of membership
implies that there is an "organization" to be "member" of.
"For reference to cases on the right of recourse and remedy, under the articles, for damage resulting
from lawful action, see Hollis, Dispute Settlement Under the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade, in
MA R7N Domxsc (ED.), INTERNATIONAL TRADE ARBITRATION 77-84 (1958).
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ability of a commodity agreement, even when meeting the prescribed criteria, is
conclusive upon all GATT members.
Article XXII provides for the right to make representations, to consult, to receive
"sympathetic consideration," and to enjoy the good offices of the CONTRACTING
PARTIES "with respect to any matter affecting the operation of this [the GATT]
Agreement." Article XXIII takes the recourse procedure a step further, by providing
that
If any contracting party should consider that any benefit accruing to it directly or
indirectly under this Agreement is being nullified or impaired or that the attainment of
any objective of the Agreement is being impeded as the result of.. . (b) the application
by another contracting party of any measure, whether or not it conflicts with the pro-
visions of this Agreement, or (c) the existence of any other situation (emphasis added)
such aggrieved party is entitled to petition for relief, first to the offender or offenders
and, failing satisfaction there, to the CONTRACTING PARTIES. The latter are
directed to investigate promptly, and are empowered to pronounce rulings regarding
questions in issue and make recommendations for such remedial measures as might
appear to be appropriate; in extremis the aggrieved party may be authorized to
retaliate by way of righting an upset balance. The lines of allegation that might
be advanced in prosecuting the recourse thus afforded for equitable relief, from a
lawful but harmful act, can be illustrated by the following examples:
Case i. A non-participating exporter member has, for value given in one of
the reciprocal tariff negotiating conferences, secured from a participating importer
member, directly or indirectly, 5 a commitment on the rate of import duty applicable
to the commodity in question. But the importing country, in obedience to the com-
modity agreement, refuses to allow importations from complainant at the contractual
duty-rate in the amounts complainant is ready, willing, and able to supply. It does
so either by outright prohibition of all over a quota assigned to complainant without
its consent, or by imposing a penalty charge on over-quota consignments. To point
up the case, hypothesize as complainant an efficient, rising producer, 6 which counts
on earnings from its exports of the commodity in question (particularly in com-
plainee's market) to balance its external trade accounts, and which has been
scrupulously fulfilling all tariff commitments it has made benefiting the trade of
complainee. Complainant could plausibly contend that a "benefit accruing to it...
is being nullified or impaired," within the evident purview of article XXIII: a benefit
expected by virtue of article II and article XI.
" The word "directly" connotes a concession granted to the beneficiary thereof in its name (here,
complainant), while "indirectly" refers to a concession granted to some third country which accrues
to others (including, here, complainant) by virtue of the most-favored-nation treatment principle. The
multilateralization of all tariff concessions (art. II, para. s-a) is one of the quid pro quo's of the GATT,
for each and all of its members.
"This would be precisely the kind of country most apt to decline to participate in a commodity
agreement, out of dissatisfaction with having to accept limitations on the exploitation of its own
export potentialities in order to shore up its less efficient competitors.
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Case 2. Suppose the same facts," with the difference that complainee has not
contracted any commitment regarding the rate of duty applicable to the commodity
in question, and thus remains free under GATT to increase it (subject, of course, to
the requirement of article I regarding non-discriminatory application of whatever
duty is assessed). Here, the complainant would presumably have to rely on arguments
colored by value judgment and choice among conflicting internationally enunciated
policy objectives. It is assumed that the commodity agreement has provided what
at least the negotiators thereof consider an "equitable treatment" (i.e., an equitable
quota)"' for the exports of the complainant, as contemplated in the criteria approved
by the above-cited article XX(h) reservation; 9 and what they also consider
avoidance of any "arbitrary or unjustifiable discrimination," or of any "disguised
restriction" in international trade, as also required by the language of the same
reservation. The question would remain whether the commodity-control actions of
defendant none the less "impeded" the "attainment of any [GATT) objective,"
within the meaning of article XXIII-not objectives generally, but any objective.
As listed in the preamble, the objectives of the General Agreement are: (i) "raising
standards of living," (ii) "ensuring full employment," (iii) "a large and steadily
growing volume of real income and effective demand," (iv) "developing the full use
of the resources of the world," and (v) "expanding the production and exchange of
goods."20 Prima facie, the unwanted restrictions on complainant's export outlets, and
their consequent adverse impact on the producers and workers occupied with the
commodity, run counter to every one of these objectives in so far as complainant's
economy is concerned, and-in several particulars-counter to them on a near-term
world basis. Moreover, immediately succeeding the recitation of objectives, and
corollary to them, there are set forth the approved techniques for moving toward
the foregoing objectives: namely, the "substantial reduction of . . . barriers to
trade" and the "elimination of discriminatory treatment in international commerce."
So far as this declaratory-of-objective wording is concerned, it would be immaterial
that the trade barrier erected by a commodity agreement is not "disguised," or that
the discrimination is not "arbitrary or unjustifiable." The wording is unqualified.
"'A Case 3 would be the converse situation. An importing country prevented by export quotas from
obtaining all it wanted of the commodity, at commercial prices, for the use and benefit of its people.
" As stipulated in art. 6o, para. I(c) of the Havana Charter, incorporated by reference via interpretative
note "Ad Article XX" in Annex I of the General Agreement.
" A contest over whether the treatment granted actually was "inequitable" within the meaning
of the stipulation cited in the foregoing footnote would, of course, push the controversy from the plane of
harm-without-illegality to that of lawfulness itself. The difficulty of determining with any degree of
objectivity just what does constitute equitable treatment, so as to pose an issue of legality, is compounded
by the fact that art. 6o, para. 1(c) further recites, . . due consideration is being given in each case
to policies adopted by non-participants in relation to obligations assumed and advantages conferred
under the [commodity] agreement." Equity thus becomes colored by the subjective evaluations of the
participants, one of whose aims is to safeguard against frustration of the agreement by "free-riding" non-
participants.
"
0 In a long-pending revision of the General Agreement, the recitation is to be transposed to article
I, entitled "Objectives," and a sixth element added, namely, "promoting the progressive development of the
economies of all the contracting parties."
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Counterposed would be such considerations as the following. In so far as alleged
"discrimination" is concerned, country quotas do not of themselves constitute dis-
crimination, so long as the limits established are prorated among the interested
countries according to the formula typically employed in the absence of individual
agreement: that is, allocation on the basis of a "previous representative period.., due
account being taken of any special factors which may have affected or may be
affecting the trade in the product."2 a For the rest, the statement of GATT
"objectives" is an introductory sketch that should be read in a global, long-range
and imprecise sense; being preambulary, they rest, for their more detailed and
explicit definition, on the operative provisions of the body of the Agreement; and
article XXIX, paragraph i, in effect substitutes special commodity-agreement ob-
jectives for GATT preamble objectives in the particular case of a commodity agree-
ment,21 an interpretation morally strengthened by repeated resolutions of the United
Nations Economic and Social Council supporting the commodity-agreement idea. 2
Relevant commodity agreement objectives, which would thus prevail, include: "(a)
to prevent or alleviate the serious economic difficulties which may arise when adjust-
ments between production and consumption cannot be effected by normal market
forces alone as rapidly as the circumstances require; (b) to provide.., a framework
for the consideration and development of measures which have as their purpose
economic adjustments... ; (c) to prevent or moderate pronounced fluctuations in the
price of a primary commodity... "22a
Just where these cross-currents of interpretative argument would ultimately lead,
in terms of authoritative decision, yet remains to be seen. So far, none of the actually
consummated commodity agreements has been contested in the CONTRACTING
PARTIES. One reason is that, as a practical matter, these agreements have come into
being after long multilateral deliberation and tedious negotiation, with consequent
reconciliation of conflicting interests and achievement of a broad consensus of ex-
plicit and implicit acceptance or tolerance. In general, the habit of cooperation
through frequent congregations fostered by the GATT, with a view to proceeding
on the basis of mutual understanding, is conducive to such a result. In particular,
the framework of standards and procedures elaborated in chapter VI of the Havana
Charter for the formation of commodity agreements, by serving as an acknowledged
2'a GATr, art. 13, para. 2(d).
" Article XXIX, para. i provides that "The contracting parties undertake to observe to the fullest
extent of their executive authority the general principles of chapters I to VI . . . of the Havana Charter
pending their acceptance of it .... " Whether the Charter is in fact still "pending" is questionable; and
this passage will be dropped (as part of a tidying-up of references to the defunct Charter) if and when
the revisions alluded to in note ao, supra, come into effect. But, if so, the argument could still be
made on the basis of article XX(h), with its interpretative note, as reinforced by the addition of the
sixth element to the "Objectives" quoted in note 20, supra.
"' E.g., those cited infra at notes 25 and 29; the 1954 resolution establishing a permanent advisory
Commission on International Commodity Trade (UN ECOSOC Ras. No. 512A (xvii), adopted April 30,
1954, and E/REsoLurxON (xviii)/28-D, adopted Aug. 5, 1954).
22a HAVANA CHARXER art. 57.
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guide to the GATT membership, also contributes very considerably to that result.
Attention may now be turned to that chapter.
III
Ti HAVANA CHARTER
The Havana Charter for an International Trade Organization, of which chapter
VI is part, was consummated in March 1948 by the United Nations Conference on
Trade and Employment at its convocation in Havana (hence, "Havana Charter" for
short, or "ITO Charter").*3 It is a laboriously prepared and ambitious document
of io6 articles (plus annexes), including chapters on Employment and Economic
Activity, Economic Development and Reconstruction, Commercial Policy, Restrictive
Business Practices, and Intergovernmental Commodity Agreements, in addition to
its organizational and procedural provisions. It proposed a common denominator for
dealing comprehensively in an orderly way with international commerce in the
setting of a diversity of nation-state interests. Thus it was hardly fortuitous that
it should contain a chapter on intergovernmental commodity agreements immediately
following one on restrictive business practices, the one curbing collusive trade re-
straints on the part of commercial enterprises and the other allowing (under safe-
guards) intergovernmental regulation of the commodity trade.24
While the final text was still in preparation, and in order to signal approval of
the proposed commodity-agreement regime pending the Charter's outcome, the
United Nations Economic and Social Council (ECOSOC), on March 28, 1947, passed
a resolution incorporating, among other things, the following recommendation :21
... that, pending the establishment of the International Trade Organization, Members of
the United Nations adopt as a general guide... the principles laid down in chapter VII
as a whole, i.e., the chapter on inter-governmental arrangements . . . although recog-
nizing that discussions in future sessions ... may result in modifications....
":The noncommittal Final Act authenticating the text was signed by representatives of 53 countries,
comprising most of the then membership of the United Nations, with the conspicuous exception of the
U.S.S.R.
" The charge that thereby the Charter was condoning restrictive practices by governments, of the very
kind forbidden to private enterprise, was one ground for vigorous opposition to the Charter on the part
of the National Foreign Trade Council, broadly representative of U.S. business firms having foreign
trade and investment interests. Position of the National Foreign Trade Council With Respect to the
Havana Charter for an International Trade Organization, submitted to the House Committee on Foreign
Affairs at Hearings on H.R. J. Res. 236, Membership and Participation by the U.S. in the I.T.O., Before
the House Comm. on Foreign Affairs, 8ist Cong., 2d Sess. 8, 112-20 (i95o). The National Association of
Manufacturers made a like argument. See Bidwell & Diebold, The United States and the International
Trade Organization, INT'L CONC. PAMPuLET No. 449, at 218 (1949).
5 Resolution No. 3 o(IV), U.N. Doc. No. E/ 4 o3 . The resolution goes on to request the Secretary
General to set up an Interim Coordinating Committee for International Commodity Arrangements, con-
sisting of a Chairman representing the Preparatory Committee of the United Nations Trade and Employ-
ment Conference, a member nominated by the FAG, and a third person representing non-agricultural
primary commodities.
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What began as chapter VII in the then extant draft 6 became ultimately chapter
VI, owing to a rearrangement of no material significance The Havana Charter,
in fact, proved abortive; it never entered into force2 Accordingly, the ECOSOC at
its thirteenth session passed a duly revised repeater resolution in which it29
(i) ... reaffirms... Council resolution 30(iv) of 28 March 1947; (2) recommends that
the Members of the UN continue to accept the principles of Chapter VI ... as a general
guide . . .; (3) requests the Secretary-General to reconstitute the Interim Co-ordinating
Committee for International Commodity Arrangements so that it shall consist of a Chair-
man nominated by the Contracting Parties to the GATT....
The GATT was fashioned in the course of the same preparatory work as an
expedient to permit interested countries, pending the Charter's conclusion, to proceed
immediately with carrying forward the Charter's more strictly "trade" provisions,
that is, its chapter on Commercial Policy. In addition, the GATT picked up the
purport of chapter VI by the technique of a summary reservation referring to the
ECOSOC resolution of March 1947, as mentioned abovef0 This reference, as it now
stands, contains a technical flaw, in that the authoritative current ECOSOC resolu-
tion is dated 1951 and, inter alia, corrects the chapter numeration; but this flaw
is not, so far as available evidence indicates, considered to be consequential.31
Thus the design of chapter VI is projected into the international legal system, even
though its host document (the Havana Charter) never itself came into legal force
and effect.
The GATT exception for commodity agreements (and behind it, the ECOSOC
resolution) speaks imprecisely in terms of "principles" and thus leaves latitude for
interpretation. Moreover, the fact that it occurs in GATT as part of a larger
" The first (or "London draft") of three successive versions emanating from the Preparatory Com-
mittee of the United Nations Conference on Trade and Employment over the period October 1946-August-
1947, intervening between the launching of the U.S. initiative for the Charter and its technical completiom
at Havana. The other two such preparatory versions are known as the "New York" and "Geneva" drafts,
respectively. U.N. Doc. Nos. E/PC/T33 , E/PC/T/ 3 4 /rev. I, and E/PC/T/x86.7 This rearrangement involved the transposition of the subject matter of original chapter 11 ("member-.
ship") to a later chapter.
"Perhaps the crucial factor was the hostility of the United States Congress; other countries tended.
to consider it pointless to proceed unless and until the United States acted favorably. For a summary
account, see WILLIAm DIEBOLD, JR., ThE END oF THE I.T.O. (PRINCETON ESSAYS IN INTERNATONAL
FINANCE, No. I6) (I95z); also see Bronz, supra note ii.
21 Resolution 373 (XIII), Sept. 13, 1951. It will be noted that the GATr is now attributed the role-
of nominator of the chairman of the reconstituted committee.
"oThe wording of the original GAIT (art. XX, para. i-h) related simply to measures "undertaker
in pursuance of obligations under intergovernmental commodity agreements, conforming to the principles
approved by the Economic and Social Council of the United Nations in its Resolution of March 28,
1947. .. "
5 1 A revision made in 1955 and now in force restated the body of clause (h) in broadened language:
undertaken in pursuance of obligations under any intergovernmental commodity agreement which
conforms to criteria submitted to the Contracting Parties and not disapproved by them or which is itself
so submitted and not so disapproved." The reference to the ECOSOC resolution of 1947 was coterminously
transposed to the interpretative notes (Annex I), by way of specifying that any agreement conforming
thereto was predetermined to be in compliance with art. XX(h). The failure to update the reference-
to %951 was apparently a mere oversight; in any event, the "principles" approved by the ECOSOC in 1947
remained essentially those approved in 1951.
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reservation which allows agreements not conforming with such principles, further
dilutes the character of chapter VI as a rule of lawY2 But the chapter has none the
less acquired considerable authority as a guide to be followed and heeded, as will
be seen below, when the extent to which it has been adhered to in the agreements
actually negotiated during its life-span is examined.
Chapter VI addresses itself to "principles," by name, in articles 6o and 63, re-
spectively entitled "General Principles Governing Commodity Agreements" and
"Additional Principles Governing Commodity Control Agreements." These articles
together, as regards "control" agreements, provide for: (a) opportunity for non-
discriminatory participation by all Members of the Organization; (b) the possi-
bility of non-Member participation, on a like basis; (c) as a corollary, negotiation
for any agreement to be held in a duly-convoked and thoroughly prepared confer-
ence, to which all substantially interested countries have been invited; (d) the cre-
ation, in each case, of a governing "Commodity Council" in which voting strength is
equally shared by the exporting and importing countries, as groups; (e) equitable
treatment to non-participants; (f) assurances of the availability of adequate supplies
of the commodity at prices fair to both producer and consumer; (g) "appropriate
provision" for "increasing opportunities" that demand can be satisfied from "the most
effective and economic" sources of production, "due regard being had to the need
for preventing serious economic and social dislocation and to the position of producing
areas suffering from abnormal disabilities"; (h) adoption of such programs of in-
ternal economic adjustment as might be deemed "adequate" and "practicable" in the
direction of "solution of the commodity problem involved"; and (i) full publicity.
Still further guidelines are afforded by other articles, entitled otherwise than "prin-
ciples," to wit: (j) an initial duration of not exceeding five years (article 65, paragraph
i), for any given agreement; (k) a dispute-settlement procedure, in first instance the
Commodity Council, with recourse then to the Organization (article 66); and (1)
a definition of the circumstances justifying an agreement, through a finding as
stipulated by article 62 in light of criteria prescribed there and in articles 55 and 56.
These dozen heads comprise a rather impressive array of safeguards calculated to
insure the bona fides of each commodity control agreement. Some of them depend
on value judgments for which there are no objective tests: (e) through (h) and, to
a degree, (1) ? Others are more definite. In examining the extent to which the
agreements so far concluded observe these criteria, or appear to endeavor to heed
them as well as might be, it will be useful to divide the agreements into two groups:
first, those dealing with primary commodities;3 4 and second, the cotton textile
92 The ECOSOC resolution as such, and apart from the status given it as part of the law of the GATI',
of course, has no mandatory force. But see infra at note 45 as to the subjection of particular com-
modity agreements, by their own terms, to principles approved by ECOSOC.
38 It is in these heads, particularly, that are to be found the "escapes and weaknesses" of the chapter,
which could conceivably prove fatal to the realization of its hopes, unless countries show vigilance and
good faith in following its spirit. See, e.g., STOCING & WATKINS, op. cit. supra note 1, at 449.
"' International Sugar Agreement of 1958, T.I.A.S. No. 4389; International Wheat Agreement, x962,
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arrangement. Further, they may be arrayed roughly in ascending order of dis-
cernible compliance.
IV
PmwutAY CommoDitY AGREEMmNTS
As concerns the Wheat, Sugar, Coffee, and Tin Agreements, it is difficult to assess
how well any of them meet the directive set forth in (g), except to note that the
buffer-stock feature of the Tin Agreement inherently, through open-market purchases
and sales, puts some emphasis on the play of commercial forces, within the stipulated
price range; 5 and that the Wheat Agreement also affords room for advantaging the
more efficient through leaving importers uncommitted regarding a portion (often,
a substantial one) of their purchases.3 6 These four agreements again do not, in their
preambles and recitations of objectives, evince overt cognizance of the purport of
either (g) or (h), except for the following allusions: "To provide a framework for
the consideration of measures to promote the progessively more economic production
of tin, while protecting deposits of tin from unnecessary waste or premature ex-
haustion... ." (Tin, article I-d); ".... bring about long-term equilibrium between
production and consumption" (Coffee, article I, paragraph I).
Their caution or lack of forcefulness on this score, of course, testifies to the source
of much of the skepticism had by critics regarding the utility of commodity agree-
ments as instruments of an efficient trade policy; 7 but that the Chapter itself, given
its vague wording, can be said to be a clarion call to do much better is doubtful.
The avowed aim of the several agreements, in general, appears to center on the
notion of stabilization and income support in the framework of "equitable" prices,
T.I.A.S. No. 5115; Second International Tin Agreement (text in United Nations Tin Conference, xg6o:
Summary of Proceedings (U.N. Doe. No. E/CoNF.32/5, at 25-42); International Coffee Agreement, 1962,
SEm. Doc. ExEetnvE H. 87th Cong., 2d Sess., Oct. 4, z962. All replaced earlier agreements, those relative
to the first three named not generally having features materially different from the current versions, for
purposes of the present discussion. In the case of the last named, the predecessor instrument was a "short-
term" year-to-year producer agreement that did not purport to follow the criteria of chapter VI, having
been conceived as merely a temporary stop-gap to serve until an acceptable long-term agreement could be
negotiated, as asserted in its preamble. Final Act of the Negotiations for the Conclusion of an Inter-
national Coffee Agreement, signed at Washington, September 24, r959; effective October t, 1959, and
successively extended on its anniversary date ig6o, 196i, and 1962 (English text courtesy of Secretary-
General of the Coffee Study Group, Washington, D.C.).
"'The initially established floor and ceiling prices are 473o and X88o, respectively, a range of 20%
measured from bottom (art. VI, para. 2).
"' The Textile Agreement, for its part, infra note 46, it may be noted, provides for gradually increasing
quotas for low-cost producers.
37 E.g., Raymond Vernon: The "incipient and completed agreements (so far as known) have re-
flected little in the way of guiding principle or philosophy.... Commodity agreements ... have largely
represented producers' proposals for the solution of producers' problems and little more .. " The wheat
agreement "contributes little to solving the basic wheat problem of excess production or under-consump-
tion." The sugar agreement contains "little . . . which . . . contributes to the withdrawal of land
from economic, high-cost sugar beet production. . . . The tin agreement follows a third pattern and
the olive oil agreement is likely to pursue even a fourth. The point is, of course, that arrangements
so negotiated have taken on whatever form a short-run pragmatism dictates .... R" AYmoND VEaNoz,
OROANIZsNO FOR WoRLD T.ADE, INT'L CoNc. PAmtpmar No. 505, at 163, i8o-8I (I955).
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and a hope of increased consumption. Nonetheless, expectation of amelioration of
underlying maladjustment was evidently in the background of the negotiation of at
least the two newest agreements; 8 and several provisions may be found in the
primary commodity agreements that look to the cutting back of market-disturbing
overproduction or high-cost production. For sugar, examples of such provisions are
article 3 (on prejudicial subsidies), and articles 4 and io (on production controls).
It may be said, at least, that mutually understood trade targets are set which enable
governments to go about arresting the expansion of unneeded production and cutting
back excess production with better confidence 9 The point of balance, as between
efficiency and inefficiency, is struck in the bargaining over these targets.
The remaining substantive requirements, (e), (f), and (1), appear to be observed
at least presumptively in all four agreements, in the opinion of the participants. This
collectively represents in each case a heavy weight of opinion, even though the agree-
ments do not on their face afford a conclusive objective answer-if any such answer
is indeed susceptible of being established, given the weighting of imponderables and
the diverging equities involved. 0
The most reliable safeguards, undoubtedly, are the procedural ones, including
the Study Group preparatory procedure. These are calculated to assure full oppor-
tunity for the play of the vigilance of affected countries whose varying consumer and
producer interests do not coincide, backed by the knowledge bred of experience that
substantial dissent and non-cooperation is likely to hamper, if not wreck, the ultimate
success of such agreements on most commodities in the long run 1 It is through
their operation, rather than the possibly self-centered opinions of one clique or other
of producers or consumers, that substantive fidelity may be expected to be most
sedulously policed. The consensus needed for agreement implies a collective judg-
ment that elusively-defined substantive desiderata have been taken into account
so far as possible.
All the primary commodity agreements observe (d), (i), and (j). The system of
allotting the exporters and importers each i,ooo votes, with agreed weights by country
roughly proportionate to each country's significance in the trade, is common to all.42
They all likewise evince compliance with the remaining procedural directives, (a)-(c)
8 Coffee, see Bilder, The International Coffee Agreement, fupra, at 328; textiles, see infra, at 406.
" Though the Wheat Agreement, for example, contains the proviso, "Nothing in this Article shall
prejudice the complete liberty of action of any ... country in the determination and administration of its
internal agricultural and price policies" (art. 23, para. 3), United States wheat acreage has been
materially reduced in the period since the agreement series was inaugurated in 1949. Average acreage
harvested 1946-1950 was 70.3 million; 1951-i955, 60.5 million; and down to 50 million in 1956-i96o.
STATISTICAL ABSTRACT OF THE UNITED STATES 651 (x962).
"'Further to "(e)," see infra.
"'The classic example, of course, was the ill-starred Stevenson Plan of the I920's for the shoring
up of rubber prices by limiting output and exports in British-controlled areas. The result was stimulation
of production in nonparticipating areas (e.g., Dutch Indonesia), and of the development of a reclaimed-
rubber industry and a search for substitutes in the United States (the principal consumer).
," The textile agreement, infra, at 406, does not observe (d), for reasons peculiar to its subject-matter;
but the other procedural points are observed by it.
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and (k), when allowance is made for the fact that the Organization envisaged by
chapter VI has never materialized 3 There are no "Members"; there also is no "Or-
ganization" to call conferences," or to act as custodian, supervisor 5 and arbiter of
disputes unresolved by a Commodity Council. But, in substitution, universal partici-
pation is sought, and various ways devised for an alternative to Organization sur-
veillance. It has been seen above how the GATT, for example, implicitly fills the
overseer role for GATT members; and it will be shown below that the textile arrange-
ment is explicitly meshed into the GATT. The Sugar and Wheat agreements, for
their part, expressly subordinate themselves to any requirements that may be laid
down by the United Nations, operating through its appropriate organs or specialized
agencies (paragraph 2 of articles 39 and 34, respectively). Additional procedural
provisions also tend to safeguard against the perpetuation of inequities and arbitrary
rigidities. The case of the Coffee Agreement is discussed in greater detail elsewhere
in this issue4 5  The Wheat Agreement provides for an annual (but noncommittal)
review of the world wheat situation (article 23); for quota relief (articles 9 and 12)
and adjustments (article 21), in certain contingencies; for amendment (article 36,
paragraphs 2 et seq); and for the termination of the agreement (and thus its reopen-
ing unless prolonged) at the end of three years, in lieu of the five years characteristic
of other agreements (article 36, paragraph i). The Sugar Agreement provides (as
does Coffee) for a thorough review at the end of three years with a view to any
modification of its terms as might appear to be indicated (article 42, paragraph 2), as
well as for other possibilities of amendment and relief (articles 43 and 44).
" GATT is a partial, but juridically incomplete substitute. It (I) lacks appropriate status as an
organization, (2) deals with only a portion of the field covered by the Charter, and (3) has a membership
which, despite its large number and preponderant trade importance, is short of the universality con-
templated by the Charter's craftsmen. The Interim Co-ordinating Committee for International Com-
modity Arrangements (ICCICA) functions also in partial substitution, as a coordinator and synthesizer of
information; it prepares a Review of International Commodity Problems [hereinafter cited as Rvaw],
issued annually since 1948 under United Nations (ECOSOC) auspices. This publication inter alia reviews
the activities of the various commodity Study Groups which serve as media for systematic consultation
and for preparing the way, where indicated, for negotiation of commodity agreements. In 1949, current
"intergovernmental consultation and action" was reported on the following: wheat, tea, sugar, cotton,
rubber, tin, and wool; in 1961, on the same commodities less tea, plus butter, cocoa, coconut products,
coffee, grains, hard fibres, jute, lead and zinc, olive oil, petroleum, rice, spices, and tungsten. 1962
REVIEW 13-41 (U.N. Doc. No. E/ 3 61 4 ). While the Committee is cautious in criticism, it has invited
attention to the Tea Agreement's lapse regarding consumer representation; Observations Regarding
Inter-Governmental Consultation and Action on Commodity Problems, z949 RaviEw X4 (U.N. Pt. SAas
No. 195 o.I.D.2); 195o REvsEw 5 (U.N. Doc. No. E/19o7) (U.N. Pus. SALEs No. X951.I.D2.); and
the failure of opportunity for non-participants to present their views on the occasion of the first renewal
of the Wheat Agreement of 1949. 1953 REvIEw 8 (U.N. Doc. No. E/2 5 7 8) (U.N. PuB. SALES No.
19 54 .1I.D.3). It has stressed the essentiality of consumer-interest representation (id. at 6, and in various
others) and for full publicity and broad participation at all stages (repeatedly); it has commented
favorably on features in the agreements that provide flexibility and a degree of price competition (1961
REviEw 16, and 1962 REvEw 8-9) and on the provisions made in the Coffee Agreement (1962 Ravsaw 7)
consistent with its recommendation for attention to alternative employment of coffee-growing resources
(i96o REvIEw para. 3).
"The United Nations, or, in the case of textiles, the GATT, is used as convoking agency.
"Art. 65(3) of the Havana Charter, for example, provides that agreements failing in substantial
conformity with the Chapter, in the opinion of the Organization, have to be revised or terminated.
" ' Bilder, The International Coffee Agreement, 1962, supra, at 328.
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Thus, making allowance for the non-existence of the Organization and for the
ambiguities in the substantive elements of the chapter VI guidelines, it can be said
that its criteria and general design have tended to be respected in practice.
V
THE CoTroN TExTILE AGREEMENT
The long-term Cotton Textile Arrangement,"6 concluded at Geneva, February 9,
1962, and effective for a period of five years beginning October i, 1962, is a special
case. As it does not treat of a "primary commodity," but rather of a category of
manufactures, it does not on its face come within the terms of the GATT reserva-
tion expressly permitting agreements based on the principles of chapter VI of the
Havana Charter. That chapter is in its basic intendment confined to "primary
commodities." Article 56 of the chapter, it is true, allows also for agreements on
"Related Commodities," but these are so limitatively described as evidently to exclude
products having the characteristics and the production and trade circumstances of
cotton textiles. A "related" commodity is one that "in exceptional circumstances" may
be determined not to "fall precisely" within the definition of a "primary" commodity' 7
but that nonetheless is suffering the trigger conditions set forth in article 62, to wit:
either
(a) An actual or prospective "burdensome surplus .. .which, in the absence of specific
governmental action, would cause serious hardship to producers [notably small pro-
ducers] ... because characteristically... a substantial reduction in price does not readily
lead to a significant increase in consumption or to a significant decrease in production;
or
(b) widespread unemployment or under-employment... arising out of difficulties of the
kind referred to in article 55 [tendency towards persistent disequilibrium between pro-
duction and consumption, the accumulation of burdensome stocks and pronounced
fluctuations in prices] .. .(and) characteristically in the case of the industry concerned,
a substantial reduction in price does not lead to a significant increase in consumption but
to a reduction of employment ... (in) areas ... (that) do not afford alternative employ-
ment opportunities....
While the cotton textile industry, as concerns production and world trade, is afflicted
in ways that smack of various passages in this recitation, its problem conditions are
" Text reproduced in 46 DEP'T STATE BuLL. 431-34 (1962), T.I.A.S. No. 5240. The nineteen
signatories are Australia, Austria, Canada, Denmark, India, Japan, Norway, Pakistan, Portugal, Spain,
Sweden, United Kingdom (representing also Hong Kong), United States, and the six member states
of the European Economic Community (France, West Germany, Italy, Belgium, Luxembourg, and The
Netherlands).
," The introductory article (art. 55) of chapter VI, which sets its orientation, is entitled "Difficulties
Relating to Primary Commodities," and the succeeding article (art. 56) defines the subject matter as
follows: "i. For the purposes of this Charter, the term 'primary commodity' means any product of farm,
forest or fishery, or any mineral, in its natural form or which has undergone such processing as is
customarily reqvdred to prepare it for marketing in substantial volume in international trade." (Em-
phasis adde:d.)
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not coincident with their general thrust.48 The textile agreement was provoked by
rising competitive pressures from the low-wage producers of Asia upon the domestic
industry of already industrialized countries of the West; and it was not the sheltering
of established manufacturers in highly-developed nations that the genesis and drafting
of article VI had in contemplation.
The difficulty of squaring the Long-Term Arrangement with chapter VI is, more-
over, compounded by the implications of a crucial feature of the latter's procedural
prescriptions. Its article 64 on "Administration of Commodity Control Agreements,"
together with article 63 (b) incorporated by reference, visualizes the participants as
falling into two adversary groups of equal voice, those classed either as mainly im-
porters or, as mainly exporters, with respect to their international commercial in-
terests.49 But in the administrative set-up provided in the Long-Term Arrangement
there has been no division into two groups with co-equal weight, "importers" and
"exporters," such as occurs, conformably with the scheme of article VI, in the primary-
commodity agreements discussed above. The difficulties giving rise to the negotia-
tion of the cotton-textile arrangement have been largely those experienced by im-
porting countries; 0 and these importing countries are at the same time mostly also
substantial exporters,8 ' although it was not to stabilize or otherwise assist the export
"The first of the Preparatory Committee drafts (art. 52(3), "London" draft) had allowed for an
Organization finding, in exceptional circumstances, that a commodity agreement could cover manu-
factured goods. But this opening was whittled back, in subsequent stages of the draft, to the "related
commodity" concept, which is asserted to envisage merely "certain marginal products, such as butter and
cheese, which come close to satisfying the definition but fail to do so 'precisely,' because they have been
subjected to more than an initial stage of processing." CLAIR WILcox, A CHARTER FOP WORLD TRA E
120 (949). For statistical purposes, the Commission on International Commodity Trade currently
includes the following semi-manufactured or processed products in its list of primary commodities:
butter, cheese, rayon, synthetic rubber, wood pulp, and refined petroleum. Commodity Survey for 1959
and x96o, respectively, U.N. Doc. Nos. ST/ECA/62, at 14; and ST/ECA/67, at 47. Proposals have been
made to enlarge the concept of "commodity" to include "products where processing had been carried
to an advanced stage" as well as "semi-finished or finished products" (BISD 97 (oth Supp. 1962)); but so
far these remain unadopted proposals.
" Chapter VI, article 63(b) recognizes the possibility that some country might "not fall precisely"
into either of these two classes; but in all actual agreements where the division into the two classes
is made, there appears to be no case of a country which does not fall fully into either one or the other-
except in the contingency provided for in article 69 (namely, a metropole with dependent territories, in
which the former goes in one group and the latter in the other).
" Characteristically, it is the exporter-countries which actuate commodity control agreements, rather
than countries requiring protection of their domestic producers from foreign competitors. The aim of
chapter VI was to convert what had historically tended to be an exporter price-maintenance consortium
into a joint importer-exporter cooperative, in order to assure a sympathetic regard for consumer interests.
In this connection, recent expert opinion (ICCICA) on the prospects for a more general use of the
commodity-agreement device emphasizes that ways need to be found for offering "effective incentives
for the participation of importing countries," in order to overcome the latter's resistance to accepting
controls designed to hold up the prices they must pay for what they buy. 1961 REvsEw 30.
5 In fact, many of them appear to export even more cotton fabrics (SITC #652) than they import.
Exports in ig6o exceeded imports in value by the following approximate percentages: in the United States,
56%; Belgium-Luxembourg, 2o% plus; Germany, 40% plus; Italy 330% plus; the Netherlands 9o%
plus. In two other cases, where cotton-content goods are not segregated from the master fabrics class,
the export excess of the overall group was Denmark, 2o%; France, 50% plus. The United Kingdom,
Canada, and Austria, on the other hand, are not importers. UmTED NxTroNs YEARBOOKc OF INTER-
NATIONAL TAD'E STATIsncs (196o). Two other categories covered by the Arrangement, cotton yarns
and apparel, are not generally segregated in this source book so as to permit comparison.
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aspect of their interest that they were led to enter the Arrangement. a
The question of compliance with GATT, however, is not exhausted by the test
of chapter VI. GATT article XX(h), as now amended, provides also for the per-
missibility of commodity agreements not based on the principles of chapter VI: to wit,
as noted above, "any inter-governmental commodity agreement which conforms to
criteria submitted to the CONTRACTING PARTIES and not disapproved by them
or which is itself so submitted and not so disapproved." Hence, so long as the
CONTRACTING PARTIES have the opportunity53 to disown the Arrangement,
and do not choose to do so,"' the Arrangement is automatically conformable with
GATT, assuming that it can indeed be considered a "commodity" agreement of
one sort or other.
But whether the Long-Range Cotton Textile Arrangement is, properly speaking,
a commodity agreement at all, is open to doubt. If it is not, then the determination
of its conformity with GATT would rest on grounds other than the article XX(h)
reservation. If it be not a "commodity agreement," there appears to be no explicit
provision in the General Agreement c6-vering it, although prima facie its terms raise
the same issue of compatibility with the fundamental trading rules of GATT that
are described in the first section of this paper 5 That it may, indeed, be considered
a unique contrivance of first impression, differing from a commodity agreement, is
suggested by the fact that without professing to be a "commodity" agreement, it is
conceived as being a "special" and temporary "practical measure" of "international
cooperation" which will "assist in any adjustment that may be required by changes
in the pattern of world trade in cotton textiles" (article i); and that it avowedly
deals with the particular phenomenon of "market disruption,"50 a concept not so
far figuring in commodity-agreement rationale and parlance.
The existence of a special "market disruption" problem"' calling for special
52 From the viewpoint of the United States Government, which took a leading role in bringing it to
pass, the Arrangement is deemed to realize a step in President Kennedy's seven-point program for the
relief of the American cotton textile industry, President Announces Program to Aid U.S. Textile Industry,
44 DEP'T STAE BULL. 825 (i96i), a fact to which attention was invited in the White House press
release of Feb. 15, x962, announcing the conclusion of the Arrangement. GATT Members Conclude Long-
Term Cotton Textile Arrangement, 46 DEP'r STATE BULL. 430 (1962).
53 The short-term arrangement of July 21, 1961, T.I.A.S. No. 4884, out of which grew the present
long-term one, was formally brought to the notice of the Contracting Parties through having been pub-
lished as one of the "Decisions, Declarations, Etc." carried in the BISD x8 (ioth Supp. 1962). The same
has been done for the Long-Term Arrangement. BISD 25 (11th Supp. x963).
5' Considering that all affected GATT members so desiring had opportunity to participate, it is
extremely unlikely that the action of the influential members choosing to participate would be challenged
by a majority of the CONTRACnNG PART Es.
" That is, the Arrangement allows administered restraints in the form of quotas on the movement
of the product in international trade; and that these may provoke charges of discrimination and prejudicial
exclusion is illustrated by current press accounts (February z963) of Japanese and Philippine complaints
about United States actions under the Arrangement.
58 So in the "Noting" recital of the Preamble, and in Article io and Annex C, the latter being a
definition of "market disruption" approved by the GATT Contracting Parties,
57 The GATT Working Party established to study the problem and recommend a Decision found
that the majority of examples of alleged market disruption related precisely to the textile and clothing
industries. BISD xo9 (9th Supp. i96i).
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attention has been recognized in a "Decision" of the CONTRACTING PARTIES,
in which the said Parties "agree" that "constructive solutions" should be sought,
and to that end establish a Committee on Avoidance of Market Disruption to keep
the problem under study, facilitate consultation among interested parties, and sug-
gest "multilaterally acceptable solutions. 5 8  The Arrangement, having been
negotiated and consummated under GATT auspices (or, more exactly, with the
help of the good offices and facilities of the GATT), and with participation of all
its interested members, presumably constitutes such a "constructive" or "multi-
laterally acceptable" solution of a "market-disruption problem" in the eyes of GATT.
The Arrangement further is meshed into the GATT by having its administrative
organ made identical with the "Cotton Textiles Committee" created by the CON-
TRACTING PARTIES at their nineteenth session (article 8); and by the fact
that the participants in the Arrangement reserve all "their rights and obligations
under the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade" (article i) . Such reservation,
of course, ipso facto ensures consistency with the GATT. Thereby, what would be
yielded by the presence of article XX(h) in the General Agreement, were it treated
without more as a "commodity" agreement, is not yielded. Furthermore, in keeping
with the GATT objective of expanding international trade, the Arrangement also
(a) exacts a promise that "those participating countries still maintaining restrictions
inconsistent with the provisions of the GATT ... agree to relax those restrictions
progressively each year with a view to their elimination as soon as possible,"60
and (b) for the rest, provides for an annual increase of at least five per cent in the
size of the import quotas that may be resorted to under the Arrangement by any
participant (article 3, paragraph i, and Annex B).
The textile Arrangement, whatever its genus, shares with the commodity agree-
ments on primary products a common denominator of approach. That is, they all
alike are open covenants, openly arrived at, and openly administered; they en-
deavor to reconcile all interests in a widely recognized problem situation, with full
participation of all desiring to be represented and to take part; they make the
responsibility a public, supervised one; they endeavor to guard against abuse; and
with varying degrees of conviction they, for the most part, hopefully look toward an
ultimate normalization of trade in the product coyered, upon correction of the mal-
adjustments giving rise to the need for exceptional regulation. It was for some
such responsible facing-up to an acknowledged special need, which defies effective
fulfillment under the classical ground-rules delineated in principle as the core of
the GATT, that chapter VI was designed to provide.
"
6 Decision dated Nov. I9, ig6o. BISD 26 (9th Supp. xg6i).
= Including, particularly, their rights of recourse under GATr art. XXIII (art. 7, para. 3).6 0 This has reference to stringent import restrictions heretofore maintained by several of the EEC
states and others against textiles from low-wage countries notwithstanding their GAIT commitments.
So, the EEC has now announced a staggered 88% relaxation of such restrictions. N.Y. Times, Sept. 28,
1962, p. 45, col. 4. On the other hand, the Arrangement is designed to obviate the irregular expedient
of "voluntary" export controls by Japan that had previously been resorted to in order to head off uni-
lateral United States import restrictions.
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VI
OBLIGATIONS TOWARDS NON-MEMBERS
To this point, the examination has been in terms of the GATT. But GATT is
by no means universal in its membership; many nations have not joined0 1 If, as may
well happen, such countries choose not to participate in a given commodity agree-
ment,62 the question of their legal rights is not disposed of by the agreement's
acceptability to GATT. Their interests can quite conceivably be materially affected,
for it is normal that such agreements contain provisions designed to safeguard
against the possibility that outsiders, who have not accepted the limitations of the
agreement, might gain an advantage over one or more of the participants and
frustrate the success of the endeavor. In such eventuality, the instance in which
a non-GATT country might have a legal claim against an agreement-participant
would be that in which there existed a contractual relationship between the two
(e.g., a bilateral commercial treaty or trade agreement) which the participant would
have to violate in order to carry out its commodity-agreement obligations. Whether
such a claim might arise would depend upon the terms of the contractual relationship,
in light of the treatment being applied by a participant to the commerce of the
non-GATT country.
Reconciliation of the obligations of a bilateral treaty with those of a commodity
agreement is eased, in the typical case, by the fact that such treaties do not generally
purport to forbid quantitative restrictions as such. In this, their aim is more modest
than that of the multilateral GATT; they tend to confine their prescriptions to con.
tingently providing that if such restrictions are applied they shall be administered
according to equitable criteria, for example:0
Neither Party shall impose any prohibition or restriction on the importation of any product
of the other Party, or on the exportation of any article to the territories of the other Party,
that:
(b) . . . does not apply equaly to the importation of the like product of, or the
exportation of the like article to, any third country; or
(c) if a quantitative regulation involving allotment to any third country, with respect
to an article in which such other Party has an important interest, fails to afford to the
commerce of such other Party a share proportionate to the amount by quantity or value
supplied by or to such other Party during a previous representative period, due considera-
tion being given to any special factors affecting the trade in the article.
61 E.g., U.S.S.R., both Chinas, Venezuela, and Mexico. The non-member nations, though in a majority
by number, account for only a minor fraction of world trade outside the bloc.
"In fact, however, they are likely to participate if they have an interest in the product: e.g., U.S.S.R.
is party to the Wheat, Tin, and Sugar agreements.
'Art. XII, para. 2, of the 195o Treaty of Friendship, Commerce and Navigation with Ireland,
T.I.A.S. No. 2155. Similar provisions typically occur in the other treaties cited infra note 74. Compare
GATT art. XIII.
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Article 6o, paragraph i(c), of chapter VI, it will be recalled, requires that non-
participants be accorded an "equitable treatment." Commodity agreement quota
schemes normally involve allocations calculated according to some recent statistical
base period, as a method of arriving at an appropriate distribution among the various
participants. The question for the outsider, then, is (i) whether his quota is calcu-
lated the same way; 64 and (2) even so, whether allocation is really based on an
acceptable previous "representative period" in the particular facts and circumstances
of the trade flow between the two countries concerned. Merely to use automatically,
for example, the previous twelve-month period (with a three-month lag), as in the
Long-Term Cotton Textile Arrangement (Annex B), even though agreeable
to the participants, does not necessarily meet the test. For a variety of reasons, the
last year may very well not be "representative" for the particular country involved,
nor take account of the trend of its trade and its developing prospects. 65 In this
connection, it is related elsewhere in this issue how it was necessary to negotiate
adjustments for several of the producers participating in the Coffee Agreement,
owing to the unsuitability for them of the formula used as general basis for calcula-
tion (itself, in turn, a subject of considerable jockeying for position).
Whether there arises a legal issue depends, then, on whether the commodity agree-
ment obliges participants to accord non-participants a quota that falls short of meeting
the test, and whether the participant actually imposes an inadequate quota in a
particular instance. For present purposes, attention may be confined to the first of
these questions: i.e., the posing of a conflict in obligation. The commodity agree-
ments vary in the extent to which they impose obligations that might conceivably
require participants to take measures in conflict with their oustanding commitments
to outsiders. However, it would appear that the primary-commodity agreements
have been so devised as probably to obviate necessitous conflicts.
The Coffee Agreement provides (article 45), "in order to prevent non-Member
exporting countries from increasing their exports at the expense of Members," that
until ninety-five per cent of the world exports66 come under the Agreement, each
"'It may be noted that art. 6o, para. i(c), allows the possibility of a smaller quota for non-participants,
as compared with participant quotas, through the proviso "due consideration being given in each case
to policies adopted by non-participants in relation to obligations assumed and advantages conferred
under the agreement."
" A Philippine government spokesman is reported to have assailed as "unjust and unfair" the import
restrictions imposed by the United States on Philippine textile products (AP dispatch, Manila, Durham
Morning Herald, Feb. 1o, 1963, p. 9A, col. i). Whether violation of the United States-Philippine trade
agreement (the Philippines being party to neither GATT nor the textile arrangement) has been alleged
is not stated. That agreement (as revised in 1955, T.I.A.S. No. 3348) contains a provision on quantitative
restrictions like that quoted supra at note 63 (art. III, para. z); and statistics show that total Philippine
textile exports, and hence their future prospects, are growing faster than those of its two neighboring com-
petitors: for the period 1957-196o, an increase in value of 22.5%, as against 12.5% for Japan and 2%
for Hong Kong, an "additional ability to export" being among the "special factors" to be considered.
(HAvANA CHAnTER, ANNEX P). On the other hand, however, the same article III contains an escape-
clause that permits quotas based on a previous 12-month history, if imposed to protect domestic industry
against serious injury or threat thereof.
" This percentage can be raised by decision of the governing Council.
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importing Member shall limit its imports from non-Members"' to a quantity not
exceeding the average it took from such non-Members "as a group" over the pre-
ceding three years. "As a group" is a phrase which would give an importer latitude
to adjust for individual, bilateral commitments in case the three-year period (which
cuts off prior to date of Agreement, and does not provide for a "moving average")
should not prove sufficiently "representative" in a given case covered by such commit-
ment. There is, in addition, a savings clause for outstanding bilateral commitments
Members may have, provided the Member concerned does what is possible to mini-
mize conflicts, and takes steps to bring such commitments into harmony with its
Agreement obligations (article 45, paragraph 7).
The Sugar Agreement provides that imports from non-participants "as a group"
shall be limited to those in "any one of the three calendar years 1951, 1952, 1953"
(article 7, paragraph i); but further, that any participant which considers that it
cannot carry out this obligation is entitled to such release as may be necessary (article
7, paragraph 3). The history of commodity-agreement regulation of the sugar trade
is sufficiently long"' (as also with Wheat, for that matter) that participants will
presumably have had opportunity generally to conform any of their independent
bilateral commitments by now, to the extent necessary. 9 The Wheat Agreement, for
its part, essentially provides that importing participants take an agreed percentage of
their commercial purchases of wheat from the exporting members (within a pre-
scribed price range), such percentage varying from sixty to ninety per cent depending
on the country (Annex A):" Considering the very small fraction of world wheat
exports not under this Agreement,71 the importers have presumably allowed them-
selves ample latitude, and more, to take care of any extra-Agreement wheat imports to
which they might be bilaterally committed. There are also various provisions for
relief from and adjustment of agreement commitments (notably, in part III). The
Tin Agreement, finally, does not provide for market quotas, but only for a "buffer
stock," reinforced where necessary by "global" export quotas,"2 for price maintenance
purposes. Both features are non-discriminatory; all willing and able purchasers
" Original non-signatories, it may be noted, account for considerably more than the applicable 5%
of world exports (e.g., Ecuador, Ethiopia, India, Indonesia, Nicaragua, and Portugal together accounting
for over ii%.
"
8 The current Agreement (1958) replaces one of a953, as amended in 1956.
"There are also rights to maintain earlier reservations, and the possibility of new ones, to cover
special contingencies (art. 45).
" Except Vatican City, too%, and figures of 30% to 50% for Brazil, Poland, and the United Arab
Republic. -
"'Export figures in the 1959 and 596o volumes of the U.N. Commodity Trade Statistics show that
significant total wheat exports from non-signatories in those years (Greece, Turkey, Ireland, and
Yugoslavia) were less even than the tonnage of one of the least of the exporter participants (Italy, with
only trade to warrant x% of the voting weight).
2Producers may be required to impose specified export quotas when the governing Council declares
a three-month "control period" (in principle, when the buffer stock reaches zo,ooo tons). In the sixteen
quarters of the period 1957-i96o, there were eleven such "control periods" declared. International Tin
Council, 596o STATiSTICAL YEARaBooyc ii.
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are apparently treated on an equal commercial footing within the established price
range.7s
The possibility of conflicts is attenuated also by the character of the bilateral
commercial treaties and trade agreements to which countries are typically com-
mitted in the post-World War II era. The United States, for example, has followed
a policy in its postwar commercial treaty negotiations of including a proviso
reserving measures it might take in conformity with the GATT, as follows:7
The provisions of the present Treaty relating to the treatment of goods shall not pre-
clude action by either Party which is required or specifically permitted by the General
Agreement on Tariffs and Trade ... during such time as such Party is a contracting party
to the General Agreement ....
In addition, it has tidied up many of its commitments by suspending, terminating,
or renegotiating them.75 Other countries have generally tended to refrain from
concluding tight long-term bilateral treaty commitments affecting commercial rela-
tions, at least in ways calculated to interfere with their entering upon commodity
agreements. 70 Bilateral commercial agreements, the frequency and scope of which
has fallen off (except by or vis-a-vis state-trading economies) in recent years since
the restoration of currency convertibility and the extensive dismantling of admin-
istrative trade controls and the growth of the GATT, have tended to be short-term or
quickly terminable affairs with an ample cushion in the form of limited or guarded
commitments or of explicit or implicit escape clauses 7
In sum, leaving aside a possible question regarding the textile arrangement and
the question of non-obligatory measures that a participant might take, it would
presumptively appear that the control agreements now in force are probably calcu-
'
8 Articles IX and XI.
'Article XX, para. 2, of the Treaty with Ireland, supra note 63. Similarly in post-War treaties
with other non-GAIT countries: China, 1946, attached exchange of notes, TI.A.S. No. 1871; Ethiopia,
i951, art. XlI, para. 6, T.I.A.S. No. 2864; Iran, 1955, art. VIII, para. 6, T.I.A.S. No. 3853; Korea, z956,
art. XXI, para. 3, T..A.S. No. 3947; Viet-Nam, 1961, art. IX, para. 6, T.I.A.S. No. 4890; but not in
the Trade Agreement with the Philippines, supra note 65, a unique instrument providing inter alia for
the phasing out of preferences that are no longer warranted in view of Philippine acquisition of in-
dependence in 1946. The primary commodity agreements would arguably be "specifically permitted,"
within the terms of the above-quoted proviso; but quaere, would the textile agreement?
" However, there remain in force, without a recorded GATT reservation, pre-War engagements with
non-GATT countries requiring unconditional most-favored-nation treatment and non-discrimination
in quantitative regulations: Honduras, trade agreement of 1935, arts. VI, para. i, and IX (49 Stat.
3851), and behind it the 1927 commercial treaty (T.S. No. 764); Liberia, treaty of 1938, arts. VIII
and IX (54 Stat. 1739); Siam (Thailand), treaty of 1937, arts. 3 and 8 (T.S. No. 940). These are
all terminable on notice of six or twelve months. Thailand is signatory to the Tin Agreement, and
Honduras to the one on coffee. But Liberia and Honduras both have minor export interests, sufficient
to be recorded in general statistical summaries, variously in agreements to which they are not parties:
cotton fabrics, sugar, coffee, and wheat (and flour), amounting together to about 4% and 8%,
respectively, of their total 196o exports.
"'A most-favored-nation clause might typically be included. But this clause has only very im-
precise bearing on the question of size of quotas, a subject on which a meaningful commitment requires
a special provision, such as that quoted supra note 63.
"'For a random example, the Franco-Greek trade agreement of 1952 and para. I of its annexed
protocol, 187 U.N.T.S. 175, as extended, 225 U.N.T.S. 289.
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lated to pose few, if any, significant conflicts with other outstanding commercial
engagements of the participants. This follows from the GATT, the extent of
participation, the margins of tolerance in the agreements, and the general character
of extant bilateral independent commitments.
CONCLUSION
In conclusion, two observations seem to be called for regarding commodity agree-
ments in the years since World War II. First, very few such agreements have come
into being. Secondly, those made have tended to observe the principles enunciated
in chapter VI of the Havana Charter to a notable degree. The first is doubtlessly
related in considerable measure to the second. Chapter VI, in seeking to regularize
such agreements, stressed above all an equal voice for importing countries, as a safe-
guard to consumers against producer-cartel exactions; and the difficulty of reconciling
producer and consumer interests has been a major brake upon successful negotiation
of such agreements.
No legal obligation has lain upon states to follow chapter VI, for the Havana
Charter was stillborn. It never became law for anyone. It has only a hortatory
status by virtue of ECOSOC resolutions, and a permissive standing for GATT
members. The absence of the surveillant Organization contemplated by the Charter,
as a key to securing the integrity of its operative principles, moreover, has been a
practical impediment to fulfillment of its objectives. Nevertheless, for whatever
reason, the chapter has evidently acquired a respectable authority as a code of
behavior to be followed; and ways have been found, through the play of a collabora-
tive spirit, through the informational and coordinating role of the ICCICA, and
through the growth of the GATT as international commercial-policy standard-
bearer, for substantially supplying the organizational deficiency.
The tendency of states, on the whole, to live up to the Havana Charter has
produced agreements that, in the informed opinion of the ICCICA, have "in practice
... assisted participating consumer countries.""8 With the experience of the last decade
and a half as assurance, and with the recent indications of a more sympathetic atti-
tude toward the commodity-agreement device on the part of the United States19 (the
78 xg6x RzvsEw 22. But cf. the opinion of Dr. John J. Schanz, The United States and a Post-War
Tin Control Agreement (unpublished dissertation in Pennsylvania State University Library, x954) that, in
the particular instance of tin, United States participation in the Tin Agreement would not be to the
economic advantage of United States consumers, though desirable on other grounds. Schanz, supra, at 247.
"' The x962 Coffee Agreement is the first involving a commodity not produced in the United States
to which the United States has been party. Current policy is set forth by Deputy Assistant Secretary
of State Michael Blumenthal in his address, Commodity Stabilization and Economic Development in
Africa, 47 DEP'T STAa BuT.L. 616, 619 (1962), wherein, however, caveats arc expressed about the
utility of commodity agreements as a cure-all and the essentiality of their being employed in con.
junction with corrective resource-utilization measures, a theme marking also his earlier statement at the
ioth Session of the United Nations Commission on International Commodity Trade. See Blumenthal,
International Commodity Problems, 46 Dz,'T STATE BULL. 997 (1962). President Kennedy has recently
declared the willingness of the United States "to move ahead on agreements stabilizing the prices of other
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world's principal importer and consumer of primary products), the future may well
see an increased resort to such agreements. If so, the momentum of the line of
precedents now built up should carry the further case-by-case crystallization of a
recognized law of commodity agreements along constructive channels. The Charter
is dead, but its spirit seems fated to live on anyhow in a code of international trade
practices such as it sought to create.
commodities" (remarks upon convening of the Presidents' Conference, San Jose, Costa Rica, as released
by the Office of the White House Press Secretary, March 18, 1963, P. 3).
